Arbitration Agreement Sec 2

This compilation was produced by Arka Majumdar (partner) and Kunal Dey (partner). It was also done by Live Law in It is also relevant to mention that a coordinated bank of the Delhi High Court on January 16, 2019 in the case of Fitness First India Private Limited v. Ambience Developers and Infrastructure Private Limited., OMP. (COMM.) 202/2016, was also confronted with a similar situation in which, in the final phase of the diktat of the sentence to the court, the petitioner stated that some of the costs awarded by the arbitrator did not provide a basis, since the respondent had not justified the charges mentioned on any basis before the Court of Arbitration. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the charges cited had been claimed strictly in accordance with the terms of the agreement and that, since elbe had not been challenged by the petitioner before the arbitrator, it could not be challenged in court in a motion under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Tribunal considered that the objections raised by the respondent were well founded and found that the award in favour of the respondent and the petitioner, who did not appear before the arbitrator and challenged the respondent`s application, could not challenge that decision on the basis of the lack of information for the collection of such a levy. The Delhi Supreme Court has ruled that the reference to the phrase “Delhi courts alone have jurisdiction”, it makes ex-facie obvious that Delhi was not designated as a court, but was appointed as the seat of arbitration. In addition, the court also found that the absence of the concept of “seat” in referring to the Delhi courts in the arbitration agreement between the parties does not change the fact that the Delhi courts have sole jurisdiction over the arbitration of the agreement between the parties and the fact that the parties have chosen Delhi as the neutral seat of arbitration. The Tribunal`s Single Bench found that, since the parties did not agree to the seat of arbitration in their agreement, the term “court” within the meaning of Section 2(1) (e) of the Arbitration Act, read with sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would have jurisdiction to file an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.

The Delhi Supreme Court therefore ruled that it had no territorial jurisdiction, since Delhi is not the seat of arbitration; in Delhi, there was no reason to act, and the interviewee is not working in Delhi, and the agreement was reached in Ranchi; it was signed in Lucknow and the place of execution/execution of the agreement was in Patna, Bihar. However, the court also found that delhi High Court could be competent if the agreement had provided the headquarters of the arbitration in Delhi. In accordance with the facts, the Tribunal also found that it was only because the contract was signed in Chennai and the part of the plea was formed in Chennai, when the parties agreed to make the arbitration in Hyderabad and submit to the jurisdiction of the Hyderabad courts, that such a clause implies that they had excluded other courts. The Delhi Supreme Court in the immediate case in the decision on a petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act held that it is well regulated that the question of the applicability of a “major force clause” cannot be decided in an abstract manner and must be decided after a review of the facts and circumstances of the case in question.